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ABSTRACT
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court recalibrated
the balance between the rights of a patentee to contractually control the post-sale
transfer and the use of patented goods. Specifically, the Court extended the doctrine
of patent exhaustion to cover the exhaustion of patents not recited in the license, as
well as the practice of technology that does not infringe any patent, but which can
only be used in a manner by customers that would infringe a patent. While Quanta
arose out of facts concerning computer technology, the implications of this decision
will be widespread, permeating diverse fields like biotechnology, including the future
of the patent-protected seed industry. Above all, Quanta, the latest of several
Supreme Court responses to Federal Circuit judicial activism, should serve as
warning to the patent community that it is far better to have the Federal Circuit
shape the patent law than to have occasional guidance from the Court.
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POST- QUANTA, POST-SALE PATENTEE CONTROLS
HAROLD C. WEGNER*

OVERVIEW

In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Eleetronics, Inc.,) the Supreme Court has
recalibrated the balance between the rights of a patentee to contractually control the
post-sale transfer and the use of patented goods versus a customer's (or downstream
purchaser's) 2freedom from patent restraints under the doctrine of patent
"exhaustion". Nineteenth century Supreme Court precedent had established such
freedom, 3 while beginning in 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") had both limited the scope of exhaustion and
permitted contractual provisions to trump other aspects of exhaustion. 4 The Court
sub silentiooverruled Federal Circuit limitations to exhaustion

5

while demonstrating

admirable judicial restraint by deferring to another day the continued viability of
contractual proscriptions on a customer's use of the goods. 6 Given uniformly antipatentee holdings of the Supreme Court since 2002,7 the result in Quanta was hardly

*Former Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program and Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School; partner, Foley & Lardner LLP. [hwegner@foley.com]. The
views expressed are personal to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any colleague,
organization or client thereof. The author acknowledges with thanks views shared by his colleagues
at Foley & Lardner including Andrew S. Baluch, Benjamin A. Berkowitz and Stephen B. Maebius.
1 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
2 Id. at 2122.
See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1912), overruled byMotion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (holding post-sale restrictions are permitted on
the use of a patented article); see also Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1913) (ruling
A.B.Dick inapplicable in upholding price-fixing provisions in a patent license).
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating "that
the first sale by a patentee of an article embodying his invention exhausts his patent rights in that
article" did not apply in this case "because the claims of the Carver patent are directed to a 'method
of retreading' and cannot read on the equipment Bolser used in its cold process recapping").
Id. (excluding method claims as basis for patent exhaustion); see also B. Braun Med. Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that the "exhaustion doctrine does not
apply to an expressly conditional sale or license").
6 See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
7 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1759-60 (2007) (reversing Federal Circuit
interpretation of infringement covering interpretation of 35 USC § 271(f)); KSR Intern. Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (2007) (reversing Federal Circuit nonobviousness finding);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (relaxing standards for establishing
declaratory judgment to challenge patent validity); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
394 (2006) (holding "that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the
equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with
traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such
standards"); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (reversing
Federal Circuit exclusion of drug development experimentation as patent infringement); Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (reversing Federal
Circuit assumption of exclusive jurisdiction of patent cases including those where patent issue is
first raised in counterclaim); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S.
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unpredictable. 8 Quanta represents one of the more important patent precedents of
the modern Supreme Court era of interest in this subject. Far from being limited to
the narrow confines of the computer technology relevant to the facts of the case,
Quanta has widespread implications covering diverse fields such as biotechnology,
including the future of the patent-protected seed industry. 9
This paper commences with an understanding of the classic principles of patent
exhaustion based upon a study of Supreme Court precedent. 10
While patent
exhaustion today is involved in high technology controversies, the roots of the
doctrine are traced to nineteenth century cases, particularly one dealing with coffin
lids.1 1 The modern Supreme Court statement of the law of patent exhaustion prior to
12
Quanta was given more than sixty-five years ago.
More than twenty years ago, in the second full year of existence of the Federal
Circuit, the doctrine of patent exhaustion started to be whittled away. 13 Merely by
transforming a claim from a product into a method of using that product, presto,
patent exhaustion was found not to exist. 14 Soon, contractual proscriptions were
permitted to trump patent exhaustion. 15
The pendulum continued to swing toward ever greater rights for a patentee; the
culmination was the decision of the Federal Circuit below that led up to the Quanta
case; that decision represented the extreme swing of the pendulum, a case so extreme
16
that eertiorariwas granted and the tide finally changed.
The patentee, LG Electronics, Inc., ("LGE") in Quanta crafted an ingenious
licensing strategy that permitted a license on some technology to chip maker Intel,
but licenses to the combination of such chips with other components of computers
were withheld - permitting further royalties from computer manufacturers for the
inclusion of the chips on which Intel Corporation ("Intel") had already paid its
licensing fees. 17 With a slow and steady erosion of patent exhaustion for the more
than twenty years since the 1984 first Federal Circuit decision limiting exhaustion,
the Supreme Court decision abruptly started the pendulum swinging back toward a
722, 741-742 (2002) (vacating and remanding the Federal Circuit's judgment because the petitioner
did not rebut the presumptions that estoppel applies and that the equivalents at issue had been
surrendered); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006)
(Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting from dismissal for improvident grant of
certiorari) (patent-eligibility of medical methods dismissed because issue was not properly raised
under correct statutory basis). But see J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534
U.S. 124, 145-46 (2001) (affirming patent-eligibility under 35 USC § 101 of utility patents for newly
developed plant breeds).
8 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (holding the doctrine of
patent exhaustion provides that initial, authorized sale of patented item terminates all patent rights
to that item).
Andrew Baluch, Seed Exhaustion.*Quanta'sEffect on Biotech Patents,LAW 360, Jul. 7, 2008,
http://www.law360.com/articles/61424, availahble at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3lPublications/
FileUploadl37/5155/AndyBaluchIPLaw360.pdf (analyzing the implications for biotechnology).
10See infra Part I.
I See infra Part I.A.
12 See infra Part I.B.
'3 See infra Part II.
1'See infra Part II.A.

15See infra Part II.B.
16See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part III.A.
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strong doctrine of patent exhaustion.18 While the Court did answer many questions
concerning patent exhaustion, it left the door wide open for further debates - and
litigation - on several key areas. 19 First and foremost, the Court showed judicial
restraint and refrained from entering the debates over whether contraetual
20
proscriptions may be enforced to preclude downstream restrictions after a first sale.
21
Crucial questions remain open in certain areas.
One of the more important questions that remains open is whether patent
exhaustion impacts the right of a farmer to use patented seed that he has purchased
and planted for the purpose of creatingnew seeds to be sold on the open market or
used for his own planting: Is the patent right "exhausted" altogether by the first sale
of the patented seed, or does the patentee retain patent rights to a second generation
growth from harvested seed? 22 A parallel question is raised where a living culture of
a microorganism is sold: What patent rights are retained for second (and third)
generation products that are produced in vivo by culturing the initial, living
sample? 23 Another topic sure to be debated, and perhaps litigated, is whether the
sale of a patented product in a foreign country "exhausts" the United States patent
right: May an offshore purchaser from the patentee under a parallel foreign patent
24
import patented goods free from infringement under patent exhaustion?
It is certain that attempts will be made to further clarify Quanta, either
judicially over the course of the next few years or legislatively perhaps as early as the
111th Congress that commences in 2009.25

I. SUPREME COURT EVOLUTION OF PATENT EXHAUSTION

A. The Adams v. Burke Patented Coffin Lids
As a matter of patent law, the purchaser of patented goods receives such goods
with the right to use or resell them free from constraints from the patentee. This is
the principle of patent "exhaustion" that is perhaps most easily understood in the
context of nineteenth century mortuary science in the Adams v. Burke coffin lid
case.26

The original patentee in the Adams coffin lid case divided his patent rights
territorially: Rights to Boston (plus a ten mile radius outside Boston) were sold to
Lockhart & Seelye. 27 Subsequently, the remainder of the United States patent rights
18See

infra Part III.B.

19See infra Part IV.
20See infra Part IV.A.
21See infra Part IV.
22 Baluch, supra note 9, at 1.
23 See infra Part V.B. 1.
24See infra Part V.B.2.
25 See infra Part VI.
26 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-457 (1873): see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539,
549 (1853) ('[W]hen the [patented] machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer
within the limits of the monopoly.").
27Adams, 84 U.S. at 454.
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were sold to plaintiff Adams. 28 Undertaker-defendant Burke purchased Boston-sold
Lockhart & Seelye coffin lids, which Burke then used in his Natick mortuary on the
shores of Lake Cochituate. 29 Natick is more than ten miles from Boston and thus
squarely within the territorial patent rights of Adams.30
But, because Burke
purchased the patented coffin lids in Boston, the patent rights were "exhausted" and
thus, Burke could not be a patent infringer as a legitimate purchaser from the
patentee.31

B. Univis Extension ofAdams v. Burke
The doctrine of patent exhaustion could, at first blush, be circumvented by the
patentee selling unpatented goods to the initial purchaser, whereupon the initial
purchaser would convert the product into a patent protected product. Then, under
this supposed loophole, the purchaser's customer of the patent protected goods would
be an infringer. Whatever theoretical basis may have existed for this loophole, it was
33
32
plugged in United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., the eyeglass lens case.
The Univis patent covered finished optical eyeglass lenses.3 4 The patentee did
not sell the patented eyeglass lenses to finishers; rather, the patentee sold
unpatented lens blanks to the finishers.3 5 The only use of the eyeglass lens blanks
3 6
was to have them polished to create finished - and patented - eyeglass lenses.
Here, the patentee sought a double reward of whatever price it could command from
the eyeglass lens finisher and- under the patent - from the finisher's customers for
use or sale of the patent-protected finished eyeglass lenses.
As summarized in Quanta:
[Univis] licensed a purchaser to manufacture lens blanks by fusing together
different lens segments ... and to sell them to other Univis licensees at
agreed-upon rates. Wholesalers were licensed to grind the blanks into the
patented finished lenses, which they would then sell to Univis-licensed
prescription retailers for resale at a fixed rate. Finishing retailers, after
grinding the blanks into patented lenses, would sell the finished lenses to
37
consumers at the same fixed rate.
Thus, in the classic sense, there was no exhaustion of the patent on finished
lenses by Univis' sales to the wholesalers because the claims of the patents in suit did
not cover anything other than the finished lenses. 38 Nevertheless, the patent rights
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.

'2

Id. at 457.
316 U.S. 241 (1942).

33

Id. at 243-44.

31

'3Id. at 246-47.
'35Id.
36

Id. at 243-44.

'37Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2116 (2008).
38 Id.
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were held to have been exhausted because the patented invention was "practiced in
part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who ground the blanks into [eyeglass]
lenses, [such that] the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents on the finished
eyeglass lenses." 39 Thus, "the lens blanks 'embodi[ed] essential features of the
patented device and [were] without utility until.., ground and polished as the
finished lens of the patent'." 40
The patent exhaustion rule of Univis for sale of an uncompleted article is
thusly:
[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies
essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his
patent, and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in
conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be
41
embodied in that particular article.
The rule of Univis was restated more broadly in Quanta: "[T]he Court concluded
[in Univis] that the traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item
applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent-even if it does not
completely practice the patent-such that its only and intended use is to be finished
42
under the terms of the patent."

II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT EVISCERATION OF PATENT EXHAUSTION
The doctrine of patent exhaustion undeniably erodes the ability of a patentee to
optimize profits from patented technology by limiting a patentee's control of patented
goods only up through its first sale of such goods or its licensee's first sale of such
43
goods.
The Univis fact pattern provides an excellent example of precisely how profits
can be maximized, but for patent exhaustion: The owner of the patent on finished
eyeglass lenses could extract a patent-based royalty from its immediate customers,
the lens blank finishers and from the downstream sellers of the finished products.
There are numerous other scenarios where profits can be more greatly maximized
44
through the patentee's control of patented products after the first sale.
When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it was done so seemingly
with a mandate for the new court to create a uniform body of patent law for the
United States. 45 It was implicit to many in the patent community that this mandate
included the mandate to redraft arcane provisions of the patent law that disfavored
3)

Id. (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 248-49).

40 Id. (quoting Univis, 316 U.S. at 249) (alterations in original).
41

Id. at 2116-17 (quoting Univis, 316 U.S. at 250-51).

42 Id. at

2117.

43 See Univis, 316

U.S. at 250.
41Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory
Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2006) (discussing how the
circumvention of the first sale doctrine through private legislation has allowed intellectual property
owners to create monopolies).
45 S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2 (1981), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
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innovation, including ancient Supreme Court doctrines. Patent exhaustion was an
46
early victim of this perceived mandate.

A. Bandag Method Claims to Avoid Exhaustion
Within the second full year of the new court's existence, a gaping loophole was
created in the doctrine of patent exhaustion that would empower a patentee to
completely avoid Adams and Univis through a simple trick of claim drafting: If the
patented technology were defined in a patent claim as a claim a method involving the
technology (as opposed to a claim to the product, itself), the Federal Circuit in
Bandag, Inc. v. A] Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc. 47 held that patent exhaustion did not
48
apply.
Professor John R. Thomas explained the easy circumvention of patent
exhaustion through the Bandag loophole: craft method claims instead of product
claims and the problem is solved. 49 Professor Thomas "recommend[ed] this strategy
[of using method claims instead of product claims] as a way to draft patent claims
that 'will survive numerous transactions regarding the patented good, allowing the
force of the patent to intrude deeply into the stream of commerce'." 50 Indeed, it is a
simple matter of claim draftsmanship that even a journeyman patent agent or
attorney can accomplish. Professor Thomas confirmed that "[e]ven the most novice
claims drafter would encounter scant difficulty in converting a patent claim from
51
[product] to [method] and back again".
In Bandag, the court's entire treatment of patent exhaustion is found in one
single sentence: "[t]he [Univis] doctrine that the first sale by a patentee of an article
embodying his invention exhausts his patent rights in that article .... is inapplicable
here, because the claims of the ...patent are directed to a 'method...' and cannot
52
read on the [accused infringing] equipment."
The Supreme Court in Quanta overruled Bandag, sub silentio, also without
citation of the case; it noted that "[e]liminating exhaustion for method patents would
seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine."' 53 "Patentees seeking to avoid patent
exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method rather than
54
an apparatus."

46 See James B. Koback, Jr., Running the Gauntlet.* Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 348 (1996).

47750 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48Id. at 924.
49

John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around
PatentRules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 252 (1998).
MQuanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2118 (quoting Thomas, supranote 49, at 252).
Thomas, supranote 49, at 225-26.
Bandag, 750 F.2d at 924 (citations omitted).
53 Quanta, 128 U.S. at 2117.
54Id.
52
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B. Mallinckrodt ContractualProscriptionof an Implied Licensed

1. ContractLaw Trumps PatentExhaustion
Following the elevation of contract law proscriptions on post-sale activities in
Mallinckrodt v. Medipart,55 the court in B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs 56
established a principle that contractual restrictions could vitiate an implication that
a purchaser from a patentee had an implied license to use patented goods, thereby
57
trumping patent exhaustion.
B. Braun was most recently characterized by the Federal Circuit in the following
manner: "Th[e] exhaustion doctrine ... does not apply to an expressly conditional
sale or license."5 8

In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the

parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the 'use' rights conferred by
59
the patentee."

2. B. Braun StretchingMallinckrodt
The patent community from most industries enthusiastically embraced
Mallinckrodt0 as being a very pro-patent evolution.61 Commencing with this case
and as further stretched in B. Braun62 much of the doctrine of patent exhaustion
63
could be side-stepped through contract - or "private legislation."

3. Mixed Public PolicySignals
But, there are two sides to the public policy debates. Professor Winston explains
that "[ciourts have allowed restrictions on the future rights of the purchaser of a
chattel that embodies patented ideas even when the chattel is sold if notice is given
of the restrictions, such restrictions are within the scope of the patent grant, and the
patent rights have not yet been exhausted." 64
5 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
57 Id. at 1426.
,8 LG Elecs. v. Bizcom Elecs., 453 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006), revdsub nom. Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (quoting B. Brauin, 124 F.3d at 1426).
59 Id.

60 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
(31See Richard H. Stern, Post Sale PatentRestrictions After Mallinckrodt- An Idea in Search

of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 8 (1994) (contending that "if followed as a precedent,
Mallinckrodt would permit patentees to accomplish many things that previously were infeasible,"
like maximizing profits in niche markets).
(32B. Braun, 124 F.3d at 1419.
6:3Id. at 1426 (finding that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to an expressly conditional
sale or license because in such a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties
negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the 'use' rights conferred by the patentee).
61 Winston, supra note 44, at 108 (citing Mallinckrodt,976 F.2d at 700; B. Braun, 124 F.3d at
1426; Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass'n v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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She adds that "if a party violates a restriction on a sale, the patent holder can
sue that party for patent infringement, which is likely to be a more lucrative action
65
than breach of contract for violating a license restriction."
Professor First suggests that:
[tihe only plausible explanation for the court's decision [in Mallinekrodt is
that it took the view that the best approach to patent licensing is to allow
the patentee to impose whatever restrictions will maximize its returns,
without regard to whether those excess returns are necessary to incentivize
innovation and without regard to the costs those restraints impose on
66
consumers.

III. QUANTA, THE REVERSE PENDLUM SWING
The pendulum continued to swing further toward the rights of the patentee as
manifested by the denial of patent exhaustion to protect purchasers of patented seeds
in several Monsanto cases, 67 ultimately further extended in LGElees., Inc. v. Bizeom
Elees., Inc. 68 - the case appealed to the Supreme Court in Quanta.

A. The Quanta LicensingStrategy
The LGE patent exploitation scheme in Quanta focused upon the key elements
of the Federal Circuit's erosion of the exhaustion doctrine. It took advantage of
method claims that Bandag held did not invoke patent exhaustion and also took

6

Winston, supra note 44, at 108.

"In a suit for patent infringement, 'damages may be

enhanced up to three times the compensatory award."' Id. at 108 n.65 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006);
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). "In a suit for breach of contract,
damages must reflect the intentions of the parties at the time they entered into the contract and
cannot be punitive-in other words, they can only be compensatory."
Id. (citing E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8 (C) (2d ed. 1998)).

(36
Harry First, Controllingthe IntellectualProperty Grab: ProtectInnovation,Not Innovators,
38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 387-88 (2007).
67Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Scruggs]; Monsanto Co.
v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter McFarlingl; cf J.E.M. Ag Supply v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001).
[U]tility patent holders receive greater rights of exclusion than holders of a [Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVP)] certificate.
Most notably, there are no
[infringement]exemptions for... saving seed under a utilty patent ...[A] plant
variety certificate still does not grant the full range of protections afforded by a
utility patent. For instance, a utility patent on an inbred plant line protects that
line as well as all hybrids produced by crossing that inbred with another plant
line.
Id. (emphasis added).
(3 53 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128
S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
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advantage of the denial of patent exhaustion in B. Braun by virtue of the absence of a
purchasers' implied license.69
LGE owned a group of patents that could be used to control both computer chips,
per se, as well as downstream computer systems incorporating such chips. 70 Instead
of gaining modest royalties by licensing Intel to make and sell the chips, a greater
reward was seen from the downstream computer patents that could be asserted
against computer manufacturers, even though they purchased chips where Intel had
paid its patent licensing fee. 71 Of course, but for Federal Circuit case law, an
exhaustion ruling based upon the sale of the chips to Intel would free the computer
manufacturers from patent obligations under the "exhausted" patent right.72
LGE took full advantage of the Federal Circuit case law. First of all, the license
to Intel made it clear that LGE was not giving any patent right to the computer
manufacturers who would purchase the chips from Intel 73 ; the license to Intel was
clearly under circumstances envisioned under B. Braun whereby there would be no
implied license to the computer manufacturers.7 4 Second, Intel was not licensed
under "system" method claims which could only be infringed upon assembly of the
computer including the chips - although the only use of the chips was for the
computer system. 75 In this manner, LGE could extract money from Intel for a license
to manufacture its chips and seek license royalties from the downstream purchasers,
the computer manufacturers. Additionally, the license to Intel did not include
several patents necessary to cover the computer in combination with the chips that
would be infringed by the computer manufacturer but not Intel. 76

(3 See Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117 (noting that method claims were contained in each of the
licensed patents); id. at 2114. LGE's licensed a patent portfolio to Intel Corporation ("Intel") for
Intel to make products using the LGE patents ("Intel products"). Id. As part of the Master
Agreement with LGE, Intel agreed to notify its customers that Intel's license did not extend to any
product which combined Intel products with any non-Intel products. Id.
70 See Quanta, 128 S.Ct at 2113-14 (describing the relevant uses of LGE's patents and how
they are necessary both in Intel's computer chips and in potential downstream computer systems);
U.S. Patent No. 5,379,379 (filed Sep. 6, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 (filed Sep. 11, 1989); U.S.
Patent No. 4,939,641 (filed Jun. 30, 1988).
71See Winston, supra note 44, at 101 (noting that intellectual property owners might use
licenses to "acquire rights, monopolistic in nature, that can used to influence the market").
72See generallyMeFaring 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the patent rights in a
second generation of seeds are not exhausted by the sale of the first generation because the second
generation of seeds, unlike the first generation, was not the subject of any sale); B. Braun Med., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (allowing a license contract to explicitly deny the
existence of any implied licenses); Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (holding that patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims).
73 Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2114.
74 See gonerallyB.Braun, 124 F.3d at 1419 (holding that the terms of a contract can eliminate
any implied licenses).
75 See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
76 See Brief of Respondent at 17, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937) ("The components sold
to petitioners by Intel are patented, but those patents are not the patents in suit.").
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B. The Supreme CourtAbruptly Stems a Pro-PatenteeSwing
The concluding paragraph of Quanta states the general conclusion on the state
of the law of patent exhaustion:
The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from
invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article. Here, LGE
licensed Intel to practice any of its patents and to sell products practicing
those patents. Intel's [chips] substantially embodied the LGE patents
because they had no reasonable noninfringing use and included all the
inventive aspects of the patented methods.
Nothing in the License
Agreement limited Intel's ability to sell its products practicing the LGE
patents. Intel's authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the
scope of the patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer assert its
77
patent rights against [downstream computer manufacturer] Quanta.
The Court restated the law of patent exhaustion in a manner to overrule both
Bandag and B. Braun, it further expanded the doctrine of patent exhaustion insofar
as post-Quanta, patent exhaustion now more broadly covers exhaustion of patents
not recitedin the lieense as well as the practice of technology that does not infringe
any patent, but which can only be used in a manner by customers that would infringe
a patent. 78

1. Expansion of the Univis Exhaustion Doctrine

a. A Component Incompletely Using the PatentedInvention
Sale or license of a product that does not fall under a patent nevertheless
exhausts the patent right if the product "embod[ies] the essential features" of the
patent and incorporates "all the inventive processes".7 9 As more fully stated by the
Court in Quanta, in both Univis and in Quanta a final step is needed to create the
patented invention.8 0 But, if that final step is "common and noninventive," the
doctrine of patent exhaustion applies where the final step "embod[ies] the essential
features of the [patents] because they carry out all the inventive processes when
81
combined, according to their design, with standard components."
77 Quanta, 128 S.

Ct. at 2122.

See id.
79 d. at 2120.
80 See id.
78

81 Id.

But we think that the nature of the final step, rather than whether it consists of
adding or deleting material, is the relevant characteristic.
In [Univis and
Quanta], the final step to practice the patent is common and noninventive:
grinding a lens to the customer's prescription, or connecting a microprocessor or
chipset to buses or memory. The Intel Products embody the essential features of
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b. Unlicensed PatentsInfringedby the Downstream Purchaser
But, what happens if in addition there are patents that are only practiced by the
downstream purchaser (the computer manufacturer)? Exhaustion rights under the
lKensedpatent are meaningless if the unlieensedpatents are also not exhausted.
This is precisely the situation in Quanta:
[W]e agree on the general principle [that exhaustion does not apply across
patents]: The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue of
practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices patent A
while substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does
2
not prevent exhaustion of patent B.8

2. Bandag Method Claim Exclusion is Overruled
In 1984 in Bandag, the Federal Circuit ruled that method patents cannot be
8 3
exhausted.
Professor Thomas explains that "the most novice claims drafter" could
circumvent patent exhaustion by creation of method claims presented perhaps the
single most compelling reason why Bandag had to be overturned.8 4 The Court did
not discover Thomas' work on its own, but rather had it spoon fed to the Court in an
extensive quotation in Petitioner's merits brief.8 5 What, precisely, did the LGE argue
to refute Thomas' charge? Was the Thomas scenario really so simple that any novice
could circumvent exhaustion? What, precisely, did the several amiei supporting the
patentee say about the ease of creation of method claims? Precisely, LGE said
absolutely nothing to rebut the argument based on Thomas. Did the LGE think that
by ignoring the Petitioner's argument, the Court would ignore the argument, also?
Bandagwas therefore overruled sub silentio, with the statement in Quanta that
"[n]othing in this Court's approach to patent exhaustion supports LGE's argument
that method patents cannot be exhausted." 86 The Court further stated:

the LGE Patents because they carry out all the inventive processes when
combined, according to their design, with standard components.

Id.
Immediately thereafter, the Court added:
For example, if the Univis lens blanks had been composed of shatter-resistant
glass under patent A, the blanks would nonetheless have substantially embodied,
and therefore exhausted, patent B for the finished lenses .... While each Intel
microprocessor and chipset practices thousands of individual patents, including
some LGE patents not at issue in this case, the exhaustion analysis is not altered
by the fact that more than one patent is practiced by the same product. The
relevant consideration is whether the Intel Products that partially practice a
patent-by, for example, embodying its essential features-exhaust thatpatent.
Id. at 2120-21.
83 Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
84 Thomas, supra note 49, at 225.
85 Brief for Petitioners at 38 n.ll, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937) (quoting Thomas, supra
note 49, at 225).
8 Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117.
82 Id.
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It is true that a patented method may not be sold in the same way as an
article or device, but methods nonetheless may be "embodied" in a product,
the sale of which exhausts patent rights.
Our precedents do not
differentiate transactions involving embodiments of patented methods or
87
processes from those involving patented apparatuses or materials.
Whereas the Federal Circuit Bandagpanelhad dismissed Univis as not applying
to method patents with no further discussion of other Supreme Court case law, the
Court in Quanta stated "[t]o the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that method
patents were exhausted by the sale of an item that embodied the method."88 The
Court characterized Ethyl Gasoline as "[holding] that the sale of a motor fuel
produced under one patent also exhausted the patent for a method of using the fuel
in combustion motors."8 9 The Univis case itself also provides support for patent
exhaustion keyed to method claims. 90
Sub silentio, the Court disapproved Bandag:
[Quanta] illustrates the danger of allowing [the Bandag] end-run around
exhaustion. On LGE's theory, although Intel is authorized to sell a
completed computer system that practices the LGE patents, any
downstream purchasers of the system could nonetheless be liable for patent
infringement. Such a result would violate the longstanding principle that,
when a patented item is "once lawfully made and sold, there is no
restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee" 9 1
Sub silentio, the Court overruled Bandag: "We therefore reject LGE's
92
argument that method claims, as a category, are never exhaustible."

3. B. Braun Implied License Trumped by PatentExhaustion
The Court finds that the issue of an absence of implied license to Intel's
customers is moot because there is patent exhaustion. 9 The Court first noted that
LGE had "pointded] out [to the Court] that the License Agreement [to Intel]
87 Id.
88

Id.
89Id.

"The patentee held patents for (1) a fluid additive increasing gasoline efficiency, (2)
motor fuel produced by mixing gasoline with the patented fluid, and (3) a method of using fuel
containing the patented fluid in combustion motors." Id. at 2117 n.4 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 446 (1940)). "The patentee sold only the fluid, but attempted to control
sales of the treated fuel." Id. (citing Ethyl Gasoline,309 U.S. at 459). "The Court held that the sale
of the fluid to refiners relinquished the patentee's exclusive rights to sell the treated fuel." Id. (citing
Ethyl Gasoline, 309 U.S. at 457).
90Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117 (CUnivis held that the sale of optical lens blanks that partially
practiced a patent exhausted the method patents that were not completely practiced until the
blanks were ground into lenses." (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 248-51
(1942))).
91 Id. at 2118 (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873)).
92 Id
9

See id. at 2122.
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specifically disclaimed any license to third parties to practice the patents by
94
combining licensed products with other components."
Sub siientio overruling B. Braun, the Court concludes:
"But the question
whether third parties received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts
its right to practice the patents based not on implied license but on exhaustion. And
exhaustion turns only on Intel's own license to sell products practicing the LGE
95
Patents."

IV. POST- QUANTA QUESTIONS THAT REQUIRE RESOLUTION

A. ContractualIssues Expressly Left Open in Quanta
Quanta does not resolve the viability of the many contractualrestrictions that a
patentee may place on his purchaser, a wise application of judicial restraint by the
Court.96
At first blush, particularly when reading the opinion of the Federal Circuit
below, it would appear that the question of patent exhaustion may have been
subservient to contractual provisions in the license from LGE to Intel. 97 But, the
Court reached its conclusion of freedom from patent liability strictly keyed to patent
exhaustion principles, without resorting to any contractual proscriptions in the
98
license agreement.
Thus,
[tihe License Agreement authorized Intel to sell products that practiced the
LGE patents. No conditions limited Intel's authority to sell products
substantially embodying the patents. Because Intel was authorized to sell
its products to Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE
from further asserting its patent rights with respect to the patents
substantially embodied by those products. 99

9 Id.

9 Id. The Court adds:
Alternatively, [the patentee] invokes the principle that patent exhaustion does not
apply to postsale restrictions on 'making' an article .... But this is simply a
rephrasing of its argument that combining the Intel Products with other
components adds more than standard finishing to complete a patented article. As
explained above, making a product that substantially embodies a patent is, for
exhaustion purposes, no different from making the patented article itself. In
other words, no further 'making' results from the addition of standard parts ... to
a product that already substantially embodies the patent.
Id. (citation omitted).
96
See id. at 2121-22.
97 See id.; see LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev'd sub
nom. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2109.
9 See Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2121-22.
9 Id. at 2122.
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That the door remained open to contractissues is expressly stated by the Court:
"[w]e note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit
LGE's other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a breach-of-contract
claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available
even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages." 100
It was indeed appropriate for the Court to show restraint and refrain from going
into the question whether Mallinckrodt should remain viable law. The Respondent,
who had relied upon the Mallinckrodt line of case law in proceedings below, had
retreated at the Court had did not even defend the decision at oral argument. 101

B. Post-QuantaPost-SaleRestrietions

1. Restrictions on Reproduced Bio-Products: The Quanta Loophole
Biotechnology presents a whole new factual context in which to consider patent
exhaustion. Modern biotechnology was unforeseen at the time of Univis more than
sixty-five years ago and there is scant guidance given in Quanta: When a selfreplicating living invention is sold, does the purchaser have a right to reproduce that
invention to make one - or thousands or more - copies? 10 2 The question is squarely
raised for both modern biotechnology-engineered seeds as well as for cultures of
microorganisms.
Seed patents provide a prime example in the context of post-Quanta patent
exhaustion where a public policy conclusion has been stated as basis for a denial of
exhaustion, where the Federal Circuit has already spoken. 103
100 Id. at 2122 n.7.

Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special
contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before us, and upon
which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would
arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and
effect of the patent laws.
Id. (quoting Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895)).
101 Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937). At the oral
argument, the following was expressly stated by the patentee's counsel:
Justice Stevens: Am I correct in understanding that you do not defend the
Malhnckrodt decision?
[LGE's Counsel]: I do not defend the Mallinckrodtdecision, Justice Stevens,
and clearly I don't believe I have to. All I need to do is have this Court recognize
that the central limiting feature of Univis was the fact that it was all one patent
and that all you were doing was fulfilling the rights that had been provided for
you in that single patent, and that that's fundamentally -- and that the Court
recognized that if there were a separate patent involved and you were trying to
enforce those rights, that would be a completely different matter.

Id.
102 See Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that "the fact that a patented
technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the
technology.").
103 See id.; see also MeFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
agreement did not violate the doctrines of first sale or patent exhaustion because the new seeds
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One of the grounds to deny patent exhaustion is stated in Monsanto Co. v.

Seruggs 0 4 where the court concludes that a contrary conclusion would have
"eviscerate[d] the rights of the patent holder." 105 There is no citation of any authority
for or against this position nor is there any public policy position taken for an
alternative ground to deny the application of patent exhaustion. 106

a. Open Questionsfor Viable Patent-BasedBioteehnologyProtection

Seruggs is open to scrutiny based upon Quanta. Although not carried forward in
the opinion itself, an issue raised during oral argument focuses upon whether a
farmer can "now freely harvest, sell or replant the progeny seeds," freed from patent
law restrictions, "assuming that the patent covers the seeds, themselves or the
1 07
method of growing such seeds."
To be sure, there are also countering arguments that remain for consideration,
including the point that a patentee's sale of seed "does not relinquish a patentee's
rights in progeny seeds because such progeny seeds are not [the subject of a sale.]" 108
Yet to be determined is whether or how the Quanta interpretation of Univis
should be applied to seed patent exhaustion.
"First, do first-generation seeds sold to farmers have 'any reasonable
noninfringing use' besides being planted to grow crops in which the production of
progeny seeds is inherent?" 10 9 "Presumably, rather than being planted using a
grown from the original batch had never been sold as the price paid by the purchaser reflects on the
value of the "use" rights conferred by the patentee).
104 Seruggs, 459 F.3d at 1328.
105, d. at 1336 ("Applying the first sale doctrine to subsequent generations of self-replicating
technology would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder."). The court reasoned "[t]he fact that a
patented technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the right to use replicated copies of
the technology." Id.
106 McFarling, 302 F.3d at 1299 ('[T]he 'first sale' doctrine of exhaustion of the patent right is
not implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original batch had never been sold."); see also
Seruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336 ("Without the actual sale of the second generation seed to Scruggs, there
can be no patent exhaustion."). The referenced opinion while directly on point similarly does not cite
any academic or other study, but only a single precedent of the Court that has either been
distinguished or overruled in Quanta.
107 See Baluch, supra note 9; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 101, at 15-16
(question ofJustice Kennedy) ("Are there cases where some downstream restrictions on use might be
necessary to prevent the patent from becoming worthless, i.e., in the biological area for replication of
seeds in agriculture and so forth?").
108 Baluch, supra note 9. "Thus, according to ASTA [American Seed Trade Association], no
exhaustion would arise over progeny seeds because the price charged for an original seed reflects the
value of'the article sold' (per Univis) or 'that item' (per Quanta), namely, the first-generation seeds."
Id. "Exhausting rights in all successive generations of seeds, it is argued, would make the initial
sale price prohibitively expensive for a farmer-purchaser." Id. Soo also Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Seed Trade Association in Support of Neither Party at 3, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs.,
Inc.,
128
S.
Ct.
2109
(2008)
(No.
06-937),
available
at
http://patent.googlepages.com/Quanta.SeedAssn.pdf
(urging the Court "to make clear that
restrictions on the use of an article produced by a patented article containing self-replicating
technology, such as second-generation seed, do no implicate the patent exhaustion/first sale
doctrine").
109 Baluch, supra note 9 (footnote omitted) (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2122).
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patented method, the first-generation seeds can be used as food or feed. It can be
debated, however, whether this is a reasonableuse of such seeds." 110
The question of "inventive" contributions is also part of the Quanta equation. 111
Thus, as the second inquiry, "do the first-generation seeds include 'all the inventive
aspects of the patented methods'?" 112 "In Univis and Quanta, the answer was yes
because the steps performed by the buyer were common and noninventive: grinding
a lens to the customer's prescription, or connecting a microprocessor or chipset to
buses or memory." 113 "In the case of a patented method of growing crops, does the
farmer perform any additional, inventive steps besides the (presumably standard)
steps of watering and fertilizing the first-generation seeds? This again is a fact
1 4
question that depends on what was sold and what was patented." 1

b. Bailment and other Non -PatentBiotechnologyAlternatives
Clearly, while biotechnology pioneers will push for a limited application of
patent exhaustion in their particular technologies, alternatives also must be
explored. In the wake of Quanta and the uncertain waters of patent "exhaustion,"
biotechnology transfers may in some instances be based upon a bailment instead of a
license. 115 "Bailment is and will continue to be a useful legal tool for transferring
biological material. However, its application is limited by the doctrine of accession,
which forces the putative bailor to prohibit commingling of bailed biological materials
with other biological materials." 116 However, there are limitations to bailment as an
alternative to licensing:
[B] ailment is best suited for biological materials which are fully
developed products capable of commercial use in their existing form or for
biological materials which will be transformed in a predictable way. On the
other hand, joint ownership, sales, and conditional sales are useful
alternatives for parties who intend to combine their biological materials and
7
create new products."

c The Likelihood ofFurtherSeed Patent Cases
Subsequent to the certioraripetition in Quanta, the Court was presented with
the question of patent exhaustion of seeds in the context of a damages assessment in

I10 Id. (emphasis added).
M See Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2120.
112 Baluch, supra note 9.
11:3
Id.
114 Id.
115 Stephen B. Maebius, Biotech Transfers: From Bailing Mice to Solling Hybridomas, 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 601, 604-05 (1994) (discussing the application of bailment and sales
to transfers of biological material).
116 Id. at 613.
117 Id.

[7:682 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

yet a further Monsanto case; it denied certiorariprior to the merits consideration in
18

Quanta.1

While the question of seed patent exhaustion is at first blush most important to
this narrow aspect of industry, the implications are far wider in scope. 119 As pointed
out by Baluch, "[tihe debate, of course, is not limited only to seeds, but implicates any
product that can make copies of itself: self-replicating cell lines, genetic material,
and even software. It now remains for the next seed patent infringement case to
120
reach the Federal Circuit and, possibly, the Supreme Court."

C Post-QuantaInternationalPatentExhaustion
To be sure, there is dictum that suggests that there is no international patent
exhaustion that may be found from the wording of Boesebh v. Graff1 21

Without

recognition of factual differences from Boesch, a panel in Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l
Trade Comm 'n122 found that there is no exhaustion based a sale under a foreign
patent: "To invoke the protection of the first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale
123
must have occurred under the United States patent."
Boeseb has nothing to do with patent exhaustion because there was no patent
right, German or otherwise, that was exercised.1 24 Boesebh dealt with the right of a
party to import and sell in the United States a patent-protected stove from Germany
where the manufacturer of the German stove was exempt from patent infringement
125
under German law due to the operation of a prior user right statute.
Boeseb has received little exposure in the case law apart from dictum on other
1 26
points of law. Nearly a century ago in dictum in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katze,
the Supreme Court reiterated the general principle that there is no international
patent exhaustion and more recently in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T,127 the Court
supported the principle of patent territoriality by citing Boesch: "[O]ur patent
system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; these acts of Congress do not, and
were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and we
1 28
correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our markets."

118 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, McFarling v. Monsanto Co., 128 S. Ct. 871 (2007) (No.
07-241) (Do[es] the doctrine[] of patent exhaustion.., permit the purchaser of a patented good to
use that good and dispose of its products as it sees fit, absent a valid contract?").
119 Baluch, supra note 9.
120 Id.
121 133 U.S. 697, 701-03 (1890).
122 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
12:3Id. at, 1105 ("A lawful foreign purchase does not obviate the need for license from the United
States patentee before importation into and sale in the United States.") (citing Boesch, 133 U.S. at
701-03).
121 Boeseh, 133 U.S. at 701-702.

125

Id. at 703-04.

126 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923) (citing Boeseh, 133 U.S. at 702-03). "Ifthe goods were patented in
the United States a dealer who lawfully bought similar goods abroad from one who had a right to
make and sell them there could not sell them in the United States." I-d.
127 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1752 (2007).
128 Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).
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CONCLUSION

A. The FederalCircuit:A Better Forum for JudicialPolicy Fine Tuning
Quanta, above all, should be a warning to the patent community that it is far
better to have the Federal Circuit shape the patent law than to have occasional
guidance from the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit can best avoid certiorariby
the creation of a body of case law that is consistent with the precedent of the Court,
which may require departures from time to time that should be implemented
incrementally, always with the aid of consensus public policy debates. As Professor
Eisenberg has noted, "the Supreme Court has granted certiorari when it believes the
129
Federal Circuit has departed from the Supreme Court's own patent law decisions."
With the Court actually intervening with a grant of certiorariso rarely, it is difficult
to see that body fine-tuning precedent.130 Moreover, "[u~nfortunately, the Supreme
Court's own patent jurisprudence is mostly quite old, limiting its value as a guide to
13 1
the most pressing unresolved issues today."a
It now remains to be seen how the contours of patent exhaustion will be shaped
by the Federal Circuit, both with respect to "living" inventions such as seeds, as well
as, the more macroscopic issue of international patent exhaustion.

B. A CautionaryNote Against 'Dynamic JudicialInterpretation"
While it may be true that the Federal Circuit is a better forum for the
incremental evolution of patent law, at the same time the Supreme Court has been
seemingly goaded into reviewing patent doctrines from the Federal Circuit. This is
particularly true where, as in Quanta, the Federal Circuit has repudiated Supreme
Court precedent, albeit rather old, outright with simple conclusions of law showing
little or incorrect understanding of Supreme Court precedent and generally without
apparent consideration of scholarly or other studies that have pointed to a need for
refinement of doctrines.
Naked policy grounds as basis to depart from Supreme Court precedent have
been relied upon either explicitly or sub silentio in Federal Circuit repudiations or
refinement of older cases. 132 Quanta is but the latest of several Supreme Court
responses to such Federal Circuit judicial activism. For example, in Microsoft,
Justice Ginsburg sounded a cautionary note: "[w]hile the majority's concern [over
public policy in Microsoft] is understandable, we are not persuaded that dynamic
judicial interpretation of [the statute] is in order. The 'loophole,' in our judgment, is
properly left for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action

129 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme Court and the FederalCircuit: Visitation
and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2007),
available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll06/eisenberg.pdf.
130 See also id. (asserting that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on a small set of
patent cases).
131

Id,

132

See id.
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warranted." 133 It may now be expected that the Federal Circuit will be much more
reluctant to set forth on a path divergent from the Supreme Court and, if
circumstances dictating a change make this desirable, the court will surely provide
evidence in the form of economic or other academic studies before it closes any
134
further "loopholes".
The blueprint for successful certiorarireview of naked public policy conclusions
is found in KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc. where Professor John Fitzgerald Duffy in
his certioraripetition portrayed Federal Circuit obviousness precedent as yielding a
"divergence between th[e] Court's precedents and existing Federal Circuit precedent
[which] is so blatant that commentators and casebook editors in the field of patent
law routinely describe the Federal Circuit's precedents on [35 U.S.C.]§ 103 as
'abolish[ing],' 'ignor[ing],' or 'dismissing' controlling Supreme Court precedent." 135

C. PatentReform Legislation
With the demise of much needed macroscopic statutory patent reform in the
current 110th Congress, it is inevitable that some form of patent reform legislation
will be reintroduced in 2009 in the Congress in the coming 111th Congress.
Will the proscription against international patent exhaustion that follows the
dictum from Boesbch be codified? Or, should some change be engineered? Will
consideration be given to creation of a statutory provision to establish the right of a
patentee to control the second generation products that are produced in nature?
While patent legislation specific to deal with the problems of patent exhaustion
might be difficult to propose in a normal legislative setting, here, with patent reform
being a center stage item, it should be more feasible to introduce whatever fair
legislation may be devised as part of the overall legislative package.

133 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1759 (2007); see also Harold C. Wegner,
Commentary, Making Sense ofKSR and other Patent Cases, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
39, 40 (2007), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vo106/wegner.pdf
(quoting Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759).
134 Wegner, supra note 133, at 40 (stating that in Microsoft the Federal Circuit majority
reached their holding without citation of any economic study or scholarly work); see also Eisenberg,
supra note 129, at 33 (contending that for the Federal Circuit to avoid diminishing its authority, it
should "like any prudent parent, should pick its battles with care).
135 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727
(2007) (No. 04-1350), availableat 2005 WL 835463. In the KSR petition, the abrogation of Supreme
Court precedent was boldly portrayed:
Less than a year into its history, in 1983, the Federal Circuit boldly
repudiated the "test of validity of combination patents" that this Court had
applied in Sakraida and Anderson , -Blaek Rock, and numerous prior cases over a
100+ year period, on the basis that there purportedly was "no warrant" for this
Court's case law treatment of combination patents and the very concept of a
"combination patent" was purportedly "meaningless."
Id. at 16.

